Bourdieu remarks that the field in which agents operate conditions those agents,
in the sense that an agent is moving along a trajectory of productive
life. He or she "appreciates" and perceives works of art, according
to his or her place in the cultural and societal field, and according
to his or her disposition. Far from innate, the disposition of
capitalist agents is comparable to Locke's concept of the mind
at birth: a tabula rasa.
The class attributes of taste are a function of how the agent has appreciated and perceived throughout his or her history. Being in his or her own trajectory, the agent is not in the trajectory of the other.
The class attributes of taste are a function of how the agent has appreciated and perceived throughout his or her history. Being in his or her own trajectory, the agent is not in the trajectory of the other.
The degenerate mind, Nordau creates as an organ of free association. It is "degenerate",
in the sense that it cannot follow a "structured" argument, but
merely associates images and ideas. The degenerate mind, Nordau
also adds, when compared with the progress of the scientific mind,
pales in its lack of discursive virtue. For a degenerate individual
is not like Gehlen, who sank down in his balloon after being depleted
of air from the atmosphere he was examining’Äìin the name of science.
Instead, as with Charcot's experiment with a "hysterical" woman who grabs a knife in a post-hypnotic state, the degenerate embellishes his memories.
Instead, as with Charcot's experiment with a "hysterical" woman who grabs a knife in a post-hypnotic state, the degenerate embellishes his memories.
to science, which Rousseau implicitly established when he denounced comparative
anatomy as having made too little progress in totally removing
the self-constitution of a a savage from the anatomist's texts,
has a social disposition, a path of least resistance networked
as a set of social tendencies stemming from class position, level
of education, economic security, and political skill (Nelkin, 276),
and/or a structural disposition, that arising not out of a pure
social system, but out of the foundations of the opposition to
science, science itself, or entirely no disposition at all, the
absence of a social indice without structuring of capital and only
a coming civilization which stands drastically out of reach of
the savage. The social disposition and the structural or scientific
disposition both have their proponents in the opposition to production
of scientific facts which use technical competence in politics
or even science itself to shift the prevailing view of science
to some other political perspective in the social sphere (ibid,
279). The structural dispositions are played out in the social
sphere of time-substantiated, historical revolutions:
there everything that one understands scientific facts to be is
linked to the political agents acting in this historical, social
space. Yet, the difference in these dispositions comes from the
fact of variations in the classes, comprised of individuals from
both social spheres (for science must happen in society), that
invest in them, socially, or scientifically, so that the political
opposition of the economically secure, to science, is bourgeois,
only matched in scientific fields with the medical professions.
Moreover class is manifest in the business of science in the groups
of producing scientists that protest other applications of science,
such as atomic power, or recombinant DNA testing (ibid, 277), where
the push for credibility aligns them with the ruling class, as
the animating force of scientific production, over, on the other
hand, production for protest, a characteristically bourgeois phenomenon.
In philosophical reaction to the bourgeois culture of The Enlightenment
(protest is not always
characteristically bourgeois), Rousseau ennobled the savage in
lieu of science (which was vague and imaginary) abjuring to explain
the origin of language in the post savagery period, although remarking
that man must have been endowed with the faculties of speech-writing-cognition
a priori.
Rousseau's discourse is structural as well as social, conforming to the social conventions of philosophical writing and to an an image of relations in the world and his text; the discourse of other oppositions to science is not social, while substantial, conforming to the principle of revelatory fare in the case of mysticism. Mysticism replaces the vague and imaginary science of Rousseau with a vague and imaginary project for brotherhood uniting the all-pervading spirit of God with the mystical agent, a Neo-Platonist who professes that the simple is not necessarily shallow and the abstruse is not 'essentially full of thought'(Fairweather, 137). The mystic is forever stuck in an alternate reality (and especially in the mind), is acclimated to the ecstatic vision’Äîwhich Plotinus remarks only appears every 1.2 years of intense spiritual commitment’Äîand unable to distinguish object from subject, seeking a faculty above reason(ibid, 13). Thus, with definite support of the enigmatic in religious experience it is obvious that the position of mysticism, outside social arenas, is substantial; however, its ignorance of social forces, where the conversation of the peripatetic groups for instance, rather than the social materialism that forces too soon, so-called revolutions, provides the model for social tendencies or dispositions, results in a distention of the agent away from internalized, historical, social materialism. It is this internalized, historical materialism that provides the clear thought of science and its progress, a progress always desired though not always realistically obtained. But Science, accepting this fact, always accepts also the status of visionaries who are comprised of multitudes who practice science, rather than the individual, unsocial mystic who must have his thought lead to vision in an apprehension of the divine. This intervention of the supernatural is a life-blood of a socially deprived mysticism, either in the ecstatic vision or in the the negation, of nihilists like Dionysus (ibid, 14) whose nothingness is a disguised nebulosity, specifically counterpoised to science, which it declaims as far from truth (ibid, 14).
(Substantial) mysticism therefore presents a striking contrast to (structural) science whether divine illumination, a condition believed by the mystic to occur to him but for current purposes is to refer to, simply, the agency of the mystic, is practical or pantheistic. While Bonaventura represented dialectical mysticism, which is said to entail some forms of scientific expression, and scholastic mystics saw their theology as entailing the practice of science (ibid, 24), these inclusions of science succumbed to the erroneous assertion that to practice science is to arrive at the divine or the presence of God, an assertion that some poor scientists have made when they have felt the mystical forces embedded in the dissident culture of their time. This dissident culture can hardly approximate science, although this approximation attempt is an extension of some mystics' foray into practical mysticism, which emphasizes deprecation 'of all mere idle contemplation' and stresses, 'an active will' (ibid, 32). The opposite extreme is the more obscure practice of pantheistic mysticism, which, conversely, is not even practiced, but rather simply pondered in quiescence, the total dissolution of boundaries between man and God. As Fairweather quotes Ekhart, 'I saw no difference between God and our substance but as it were all God.... God is God and our substance a creature in God.' These practical and pantheistic mysticisms have been characterized as presenting the range of mysticisms and have been presented as the mystics lady of heavenward gaze: R. A. Vaughn writes, 'Mysticism puts on her beautiful garments. See her standing gazing heavenward, her rapt soul sitting in her eyes, and about her what a troop of shin-ing ones!(ibid, 38). Here is the contrast to science, which too has been personified, though embodies humans' progress in the promethean struggle, to define laws of natural systems which include special systems of technology, the regeneration of tissue from synthetic components for instance(Mooney &Mikos, 60), and the metaphorical regeneration of prometheus' liver in tribute to him after being saved from the eagle by Hercules, escaping but with a partial liver.
Tissue regeneration is just one of the frontiers of science that show man's understanding of himself and his patient commitment to his progress’Äîand the beauty of science, the beauty of the structural disposition which is linked to society through the history of its development...
Rousseau's discourse is structural as well as social, conforming to the social conventions of philosophical writing and to an an image of relations in the world and his text; the discourse of other oppositions to science is not social, while substantial, conforming to the principle of revelatory fare in the case of mysticism. Mysticism replaces the vague and imaginary science of Rousseau with a vague and imaginary project for brotherhood uniting the all-pervading spirit of God with the mystical agent, a Neo-Platonist who professes that the simple is not necessarily shallow and the abstruse is not 'essentially full of thought'(Fairweather, 137). The mystic is forever stuck in an alternate reality (and especially in the mind), is acclimated to the ecstatic vision’Äîwhich Plotinus remarks only appears every 1.2 years of intense spiritual commitment’Äîand unable to distinguish object from subject, seeking a faculty above reason(ibid, 13). Thus, with definite support of the enigmatic in religious experience it is obvious that the position of mysticism, outside social arenas, is substantial; however, its ignorance of social forces, where the conversation of the peripatetic groups for instance, rather than the social materialism that forces too soon, so-called revolutions, provides the model for social tendencies or dispositions, results in a distention of the agent away from internalized, historical, social materialism. It is this internalized, historical materialism that provides the clear thought of science and its progress, a progress always desired though not always realistically obtained. But Science, accepting this fact, always accepts also the status of visionaries who are comprised of multitudes who practice science, rather than the individual, unsocial mystic who must have his thought lead to vision in an apprehension of the divine. This intervention of the supernatural is a life-blood of a socially deprived mysticism, either in the ecstatic vision or in the the negation, of nihilists like Dionysus (ibid, 14) whose nothingness is a disguised nebulosity, specifically counterpoised to science, which it declaims as far from truth (ibid, 14).
(Substantial) mysticism therefore presents a striking contrast to (structural) science whether divine illumination, a condition believed by the mystic to occur to him but for current purposes is to refer to, simply, the agency of the mystic, is practical or pantheistic. While Bonaventura represented dialectical mysticism, which is said to entail some forms of scientific expression, and scholastic mystics saw their theology as entailing the practice of science (ibid, 24), these inclusions of science succumbed to the erroneous assertion that to practice science is to arrive at the divine or the presence of God, an assertion that some poor scientists have made when they have felt the mystical forces embedded in the dissident culture of their time. This dissident culture can hardly approximate science, although this approximation attempt is an extension of some mystics' foray into practical mysticism, which emphasizes deprecation 'of all mere idle contemplation' and stresses, 'an active will' (ibid, 32). The opposite extreme is the more obscure practice of pantheistic mysticism, which, conversely, is not even practiced, but rather simply pondered in quiescence, the total dissolution of boundaries between man and God. As Fairweather quotes Ekhart, 'I saw no difference between God and our substance but as it were all God.... God is God and our substance a creature in God.' These practical and pantheistic mysticisms have been characterized as presenting the range of mysticisms and have been presented as the mystics lady of heavenward gaze: R. A. Vaughn writes, 'Mysticism puts on her beautiful garments. See her standing gazing heavenward, her rapt soul sitting in her eyes, and about her what a troop of shin-ing ones!(ibid, 38). Here is the contrast to science, which too has been personified, though embodies humans' progress in the promethean struggle, to define laws of natural systems which include special systems of technology, the regeneration of tissue from synthetic components for instance(Mooney &Mikos, 60), and the metaphorical regeneration of prometheus' liver in tribute to him after being saved from the eagle by Hercules, escaping but with a partial liver.
Tissue regeneration is just one of the frontiers of science that show man's understanding of himself and his patient commitment to his progress’Äîand the beauty of science, the beauty of the structural disposition which is linked to society through the history of its development...
